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THE NORTHWEST POWER ACT AND
RESERVED TRIBAL RIGHTS
Allen H. Sanders*
The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act'
(Northwest Power Act) provides:
Nor shall any provision of this Act or any plan or program adopted pursuant
to the Act (1) affect the rights or jurisdictions of the ... Indian tribes...
over waters of any river or stream or over any groundwater resource... [or]
(3) otherwise be construed to alter or establish the respective rights of...
Indian tribes ... with respect to any water or water-related rights. 2
Reserved tribal rights therefore are not affected by the Act. 3 Those
rights, which include treaty reserved fishing rights and, implicitly, re-
served water rights, are a mandate for fish preservation, independent of
the fish protection provisions of the Northwest Power Act.4 As such, they
must be respected by implementors of the Act, regardless of its other pro-
visions.
Since the implementation of the Act's fish protection provisions will
undoubtedly affect the scope of protection provided to Indian tribes, the
Act's ambiguities must be interpreted in a way that honors and preserves
these reserved tribal rights. 5 This article examines the substantial body of
case law applicable to these reserved tribal rights, with particular atten-
tion to the major fish protection issues that may arise under the Act.
* B.A., 1969, University of Rochester J.D., 1972, University of Pennsylvania; Associate with
Bell & Ingram, P.S., Everett, Washington; Adjunct Professor of Indian Law, University of Puget
Sound School of Law; Former Staff Attorney, Evergreen Native American Project; Former Reserva-
tion Attorney, Muckleshoot Tribal Government.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 839-839h (Supp. V 1981))
[hereinafter cited as Northwest Power Act].
2. Northwest PowerAct, supra note I, § 10(h), 16 U.S.C. § 839g(h) (Supp. V 1981).
3. The Supreme Court has been "extremely reluctant" to find a congressional abrogation of
reserved tribal rights, absent explicit statutory language. Washington v. Washington State Commer-
cial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979). See also United States v. Winnebago
Tribe of Nebraska, 542 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1976) (Army Corps of Engineers lacked congressional
authorization to construct dam and reservoir adversely impacting reserved tribal rights); Confederated
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553 (D. Or. 1977) (same).
4. The fish protection provisions are found in Northwest Power Act, supra note 1, §§ 2(3)(A),
4(e)(2), & 4(h), 16 U.S.C. §§ 839(3)(A), 839b(e)(2), & 839b(h) (Supp. V 1981).
5. Cf. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1975) (statutes passed for benefit 6f Indians
must be liberally construed, with doubtful expressions resolved in favor of Indians); McClanahan v.
State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973) (same principle applied to Indian treaties);
Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 692 F.2d. 1223 (9th Cir. 1982) (same
principle applied to statutes).
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The Northwest Power Act presents an ambitious congressional man-
date in response to a very serious problem: the drastic reduction of highly
valuable fish resources by poorly planned hydroelectric development. 6
The Act requires that anadromous fish supplies be preserved and en-
hanced, and any adverse impacts mitigated. 7 But the purpose of this arti-
cle is not to analyze the Act's statutory language on fish conservation and
protection. 8 Rather, it focuses on what must be done to comply with a
much older body of law: the Stevens Treaties' fishing rights 9 and the tri-
bal right to water under the Winters Doctrine.' 0 These rights, which le-
6. For a good discussion of how poorly planned hydro development can exact enormous and
unnecessary costs in terms of fish resources, see Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of
the Pacific Northwest's Anadromous Fish Resources for a Peaceful Coexistence with the Federal
Columbia River Power System, II ENVTL. L. 211, 217-49 (1981).
7. See Northwest Power Act, supra note 1, § 4(h), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h) (Supp. V 1981) (the
"4(h) program"); Fish and Wildlife Program Approval Issues: A Legal Perspective On Scientific
Proof, Economic Cost, and Indian Treaty Rights. NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 17 ANADROMOUS
FISH LAW MEMO, Apr. 1982, at 1. Although the 4(h) program is directed primarily at problems in the
Columbia River Basin, Congress expected similar treatment for the fish resource throughout the area
affected by the Act. See Northwest Power Act, supra note 1, §§ 2(3)(A), 4(e)(2), & 10(A), 16
U.S.C. §§ 839(3)(A), 839b(e)(2), & 839g(h) (Supp. V 1981); H.R. REP. No. 976, Part II, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1980). The 4(h) program should be viewed as a model of the detailed, procedural
and substantive standards which must be a part of any future energy planning and production. Treaty
fishing rights are not limited to the Columbia. When Congress explicitly acknowledged the need to
protect all reserved tribal rights, it obviously contemplated fish protection measures throughout the
region. Northwest Power Act, supra note 1, § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 83 9 g (Supp. V 1981). See also Fish
and Wildlife Protection Outside the Columbia River Basin Under the Northwest Power and Conser-
vation Act, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 20 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO. Dec. 1982, at 1.
8. For this analysis see Blumm, Fulfilling tile Parity Promise: A Perspective on Scientific Proof.
Economic Cost, and Indian Treaty Rights in the Approval of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program, 13 ENVTL L. 103 (1982).
9. Isaac Ingalls Stevens, governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Washington Territory
in the 1850's, negotiated a series of treaties with Pacific Northwest Indians beginning in 1854. These
treaties, known collectively as the Stevens Treaties, secured for the new Washington Territory 64
million acres of Indian land. Comment, Empty Victories: Indian Treaty Fishing Rights in the Pacific
Northwest, 10 ENVTL. L. 413, 416-17 (1980). See also infra part II.
Stevens negotiated the following treaties: Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854. 10 Stat. 1132;
Treaty of Point Elliot, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927; Treaty of Point No Point, Jan. 26, 1855. 12 Stat.
933; Treaty of Neah Bay, Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939; Treaty with the Walla Walla, June 9, 1855, 12
Stat. 945; Treaty with the Yakimas, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951; Treaty with the Nez Perce, June I I.
1855, 12 Stat. 957; Treaty with the Tribes of Middle Oregon, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963; Treaty
with the Quinaielts, July 1, 1855 & Jan. 25, 1856, 12 Stat. 971; Treaty with the Flathead, July 16,
1855, 12 Stat. 975.
10. The Winters Doctrine derives its name from Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
The doctrine stands for the proposition that when the United States establishes an Indian reservation.
sufficient water rights are impliedly reserved to realize the purposes of the reservation. See generally
Pelcyger, The Winters Doctrine and the Greening of the Reservations, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 19 (1977).
In Winters, the Court enjoined the construction of off-reservation dams or reservoirs that would
deprive the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation of the water needed to irrigate its arid land. The Winters
Doctrine is not limited to irrigation needs. Fishery needs may also be the basis of a reserved water
fight under the doctrine. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 298 (1976); Colville Confederated
Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). Where a primary
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gaily cannot be compromised, must be provided for when the fish conser-
vation provisions of the Act are implemented.
I. RULES FOR CONSTRUING TREATIES AND OTHER TRIBAL
RIGHTS
A. No Balancing
One of the unique aspects of reserved tribal rights is that they are not
considered susceptible to balancing against other priorities; tribal fish and
water rights are property interests. They stem from Indian property rights
which pre-existed the formation of the United States. "1 At the time Euro-
peans happened upon this part of the world, principles of international
law mandated that the property rights of the original inhabitants be fully
respected. 12 Absent purchase through treaty or agreement, or acquisition
by a "just war," these rights were to remain undiminished. 13
The Stevens Treaties were designed to permit the purchase of lands
occupied by the Northwest Indians, presumably on fair and honorable
terms. 14 To sweeten the deal, the protection of fishing rights was guaran-
teed. 15 Thus, the land cessions were not intended to diminish tribal fish-
ing rights in any significant way. The only limitation on tribal fishing
anticipated by the parties to the treaties was that non-Indians would be
able to harvest a share of the abundant fish resource. 16
purpose of an Indian land reservation is to secure an on-reservation fishery for the tribe, that tribe has
a right, dating from at least the reservation's establishment, to sufficient water to maintain the on-
reservation fishery. See id. at 48; United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286
(9th Cir. 1981), modified, 666 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 205 (1982); United
States v. Anderson, 6 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM) F-129 (E.D. Wash.
July 23, 1979), 9 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM) 3137 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 23,
1982); United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336, 345 (D. Or. 1979), appeal docketed, Nos. 80-3229,
80-3245, 80-3246, 80-3257 (9th Cir. filed June 18, 1980).
11. United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286, 1289, 1305 (9th Cir. 1981)
(water rights), modified, 666 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 205 (1982); United States
v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321,338-39 (9th Cir. 1956) (water rights), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 988 (1957); Northern Paiute Nation v. United States, 30 Ind. CI. Comm. 210 (1973) (water
rights); Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658, 659 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (fishing rights), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 818 (1962).
12. See FaLix S. CottNs HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 50-58 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
1982 HANDBOOK].
13. Id.
14. Id. at 66-70, 330-31. The tribes were paid $207,500 for millions of acres of land which were
clearly worth far more. The Supreme Court has noted that this fact was significant in determining the
scope of the fishing rights reserved by the Stevens Treaties. Washington v. Washington State Com-
mercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 677 & n. 11 (1979).
15. 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 66.
16. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658,668(1979).
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The water rights that the tribes reserved are also substantial property
rights and are entitled to unqualified protection. They extend to all the
water appurtenant to the Indians' land reservations that is necessary to
achieve the purposes of those reservations, 17 including the preservation
and enhancement of fisheries. 18
The concept that reserved tribal rights cannot be balanced away be-
cause of other priorities or concerns has been recognized by both the Su-
preme Court and lower courts. 19 This no-balancing concept is crucial
when measuring tribal rights to fish habitat protection. It distinguishes
those rights from other environmental protections afforded under federal
or state statutes. 2
0
17. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
598-600(1963).
18. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 453 U.S.
1092 (1981).
19. See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1976) (water rights); New Mex-
ico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1113 (10th Cir. 1976) (water rights); United States v. Adair, 478 F.
Supp. 336, 344-45 (D. Or. 1979), appeal docketed, Nos. 80-3229, 80-3245, 80-3257 (9th Cir. filed
June 18, 1980).
Substantial non-Indian investment based on a mistaken assumption that reserved tribal rights were
not being violated is simply irrelevant, as it would be in any other trespass action. See Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. at 138-39; United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 339
(9th Cir. 1939); New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 113; 1982 HANDBOOK. supra note 12, at 587.
Another important aspect of the principle that reserved tribal rights are not subject to judicial compro-
mise is that tribes are not bound by state statutes of limitations or common law notions of estoppel
and laches in relying upon them. See Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Helix Irrigation
Dist., 514 F.2d 465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1977); United States v. Southern Pacific
Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676, 699 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States,
243 U.S. 389, 408-09 (1917) (erroneous or unauthorized actions by federal officials do not excuse
violations by "innocent" third parties who relied on those actions); Cramer v. United States. 261
U.S. 219, 234 (1932) (same); Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, 138 (1922) (same).
20. In Phase II of United States v. Washington, see infra text accompanying notes 45-49, the
district court was careful to follow this principle. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187,
206, 208 (W.D. Wash. 1980). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish the reserved
fishing right from reserved water rights in regard to the balancing issue. United States v. Washington,
694 F.2d 1374, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1982). This holding may be questioned in light of the Supreme
Court's reliance on water rights principles in measuring the scope of the treaty fishing right. Wash-
ington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 685-86
(1979). The Phase II panel provided no precedent for its holding, and it seems to have confused the
scope of the treaty right with the equitable considerations available to courts when providing specific
remedies for its violation. In another case decided a few months earlier, another panel of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon the Phase II district court decision and applied the distinction
between the scope of the right and the appropriate remedy. Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside
Valley Irrigation, Nos. 80-3505, 81-3002, 81-3068, 81-3069 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1982). The court
described the duty to refrain from degrading treaty-secured fisheries in absolute terms. The remedy.
however, required the parties to attempt to accomodate both the needs of the tribe and those of the
irrigation districts involved. Pending a report to the court on how this might be done, the treaty
fishery was given priority. Id. Petitions for rehearing are pending in both cases, and en banc review is
being sought because of the apparent inconsistencies between these two decisions.
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Therefore, whatever cost/benefit analysis or other balancing that the
Northwest Power Act may permit as to the non-treaty fish and water
share, the tribal share remains undiminished and not subject to trade-off
for other uses, such as electricity. In other words, the quantity of the re-
source reserved by the tribes should determine the scope of protections
that must be afforded. These protections may not be defined merely by
balancing the competing interests.
B. Identifying the Breadth of Treaty Rights
Indian treaties are entitled to a broad and liberal construction which (1)
is consistent with the understandings of the treaty negotiators and (2) fur-
thers the purpose of the treaty right.21 Interpretations should take into ac-
count the unequal bargaining position of the parties, language barriers,
and similar disadvantages faced by the tribes.22 The likely Indian under-
standing is entitled to greater consideration than any particular technical
definition of legal terms. 23 Furthermore, any right which Indian people
did not expressly give up is generally deemed reserved. 24 Ambiguities in
treaties, statutes, executive orders, or agreements regarding Indian rights
and immunities are to be resolved in favor of protecting Indian interests. 25
Thus, the first and most important step in interpreting the scope of re-
served tribal rights is to understand the circumstances under which the
Indian treaties were made and the Indians' land reservations were estab-
lished.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE STEVENS TREATIES FISHING
PROVISION
A. Historical Background of the Stevens Treaties
The language of the fishing provisions in the Stevens Treaties is typi-
fied by the Treaty of Medicine Creek, which provides:
21. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 675-76(1979).
22. Id.
23. Id.; see also Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970);,United States v.
Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899); Worcesterv.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,551-54, 582 (1832).
24. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
25. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 675-76 (1979) (treaty); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) (statutes);
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S 373, 392 (1976); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199-200
(1975) (agreement); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 264, 174 (1973) (treaty
and statutes); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963) (executive order).
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The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is
further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory,
and of erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing, together with
the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their
horses on open and unclaimed lands: Provided, however, That they shall not
take shell fish from any beds staked or cultivated by citizens. 26
In 1979, the Supreme Court in Washington v. Washington State Com-
mercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n (Fishing Vessel)27 flatly rejected
the argument that this language secured nothing more than an opportunity
to try to catch fish on an equal basis with non-Indians. The Supreme
Court said:
For notwithstanding the bitterness that this litigation has engendered, the
principal issue involved is virtually a "matter decided" by our previous
holdings.
The Court has interpreted the fishing clause in these treaties on six prior
occasions. In all these cases the Court placed a relatively broad gloss on the
Indians' fishing rights and-more or less explicitly-rejected the State's
"equal opportunity" approach .... 28
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court briefly reviewed the
background of the treaty negotiations. 29 The Court's reading of this back-
ground is, of course, crucial to defining the scope of any reserved tribal
rights.30
The Northwest tribes were primarily fishing societies, who also relied
on hunting and gathering. The abundant fish resource was the lifeblood of
their economy and culture. To protect salmon and trout, tribes had cus-
toms to prevent pollution of rivers, particularly during spawning. They
practiced religious rites to ensure the return of anadromous fish. When
Governor Stevens undertook to negotiate the release of Indian land claims
in Washington Territory, he realized the Indians would be far more will-
ing to give up their land if they knew their fisheries would be secure.
A major part of Governor Stevens' job of selling the treaties to the
Indians therefore was convincing them that non-Indian settlement would
never threaten their highly successful fish-dependent economies and cul-
ture. The following words were typical of the guarantees the Governor
made:
26. Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132, 1133. Other treaties, such as the
Treaty of Point No Point, state that the Indians' right to take fish at accustomed places is secured to
Indians "in common with all citizens of the United States." 12 Stat. 933, 934.
27. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
28. Id. at 679. The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the treaties were not "self-
enforcing." Id. at 693 n.33.
29. Id. at 664-68, 676.
30. See supra note 9 and text accompanying notes 11-23.
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Are you not my children and also the children of the Great Father? What
will I not do for my children, and what will you not for yours? Would you
not die for them? This paper is such as a man would give to his children and
I will tell you why. This paper gives you a home. Does not a father give his
children a home? ... This paper secures yourfish. Does not a father give
food to his children?3t
While the tribes understood that the treaties would allow non-Indians a
share of the resource, they were assured that their share was secure. 32 The
tribes would not have expected that non-Indians could permanently di-
minish or destroy the supply of fish available to them.
The treaty negotiators clearly intended the treaties to preclude forever
non-Indian settlers from monopolizing the Indian fisheries, 33 regardless
of whether this monopolization occurred directly through commercial
harvests or indirectly through energy development. At the time of the
treaties, the tribes were the chief entrepreneurs in developing the re-
source; Indian fish harvests were increasing to accomodate the growing
commercial markets for both local non-Indian consumption and export. 34
All indications were that the Indians would continue to dominate the
Northwest fish industry. 35 After the treaties were signed, federal officials
promoted the expansion of Indian fish enterprises, by encouraging the de-
velopment of new markets for Indian-caught fish as the non-Indian popu-
lation increased. 36 For a few decades the promise to preserve and protect
the cornerstone of Indian economic self-sufficiency and culture appeared
to be honored.
B. Judicial Enforcement of the Stevens Treaties Rights
At the end of the nineteenth century, it became apparent that non-Indi-
ans were attempting to monopolize the salmon resource for their own pur-
poses, thereby depriving the tribes of their treaty share. As early as 1905,
31. This statement was made during the negotiations of the Point No Point Treaty, and is quoted
in Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 667 n. 11 (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 666.
34. Id. at 664-65 & nn. 7 & 8.
35. Id. at 668-69; see also United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 350-52 (W.D. Wash.
1974) (describing Indian fishing activity at the time of the treaty negotiations).
36. For example, a few years after the treaties, Indian Agent Simmons reported:
The salmon that run up the Qui-nai-elt river, in great numbers, are considered the fattest and
best flavored of any taken on this coast, and the Indians should be encouraged to open a trade in
them. I think they can be more profitably employed at present in this way than in agricultural
pursuits, as it will be a more congenial employment for them.
Brief for Appellee United States at 22, United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982).
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in United States v. Winans,37 the Supreme Court ruled that the treaty was
intended to preserve the tribes' fish supply, and not merely to provide
them an opportunity to catch whatever non-Indians chose not to use.
In Winans, the United States sued on behalf of the Yakima Indian Na-
tion to prevent a non-Indian from taking all the fish at a tribal fishing area
while excluding Indian fishermen from his land. The successful suit es-
tablished two important legal principles. First, the treaty fishing right
meant that non-Indian settlers could not destroy an entire fish run destined
for a traditional tribal use. 38 Second, the land acquired from the Indians
pursuant to the treaty was encumbered to the extent necessary to fulfill
treaty fishing rights; Indians were free to cross private property to get to
their accustomed fishing areas. 39
The Supreme Court has had other occasions to point out that the treaty
right to fish is different from the rights of ordinary citizens. In Tulee v.
Washington,40 the Court struck down enforcement of state licensing re-
quirements against a treaty Indian. And, in a series of cases involving the
Puyallup Tribe, 41 the Court emphasized that the treaties guaranteed more
than merely equal fishing opportunities between Indians and non-Indians.
Rather, the treaties guaranteed that fish would be allowed to reach their
usual and accustomed areas. Finally, in Fishing Vessel,42 the Court re-
peatedly stressed that the treaties secured a "right of taking fish," not
merely an opportunity to drop a net in barren water. 43
C. Tribal Fishing Rights Under the Stevens Treaties: United States v.
Washington
In 1969, a federal district court judge ruled in Sohappy v. Smithnn that
treaty Indians had "an absolute right" to Columbia River fisheries and
were "entitled to a fair share" of the fish produced by that system.45 No
party appealed the decision. Nevertheless, the State of Washington con-
37. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
38. Id. at 382 (white men may not "construct and use a device which gives them exclusive
possession of the fishing places").
39. Id. at 380-81. See also Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 679-81 (discussing Winans); Seufert
Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 198 (1919) (treaty Indians have right to fish in accustomed
places, even in areas outside reservations).
40. 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
41. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977); Department of Game v. Puy-
allup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
42. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
43. Id. at 674, 677 n.22, 683 (emphasis added).
44. 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).
45. Id. at 911.
364
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tinued to arrest and seize property of treaty Indians who attempted to ex-
ercise their fishing rights.
Because of Washington's refusal to recognize treaty fishing rights, the
United States, in 1970, sued the state to adjudicate comprehensively the
limits of state power over treaty fisheries. Additional tribes intervened on
their own behalf. Plaintiffs alleged that the state violated treaty fishing
rights in two ways: (1) by permitting non-Indian fishermen to harvest vir-
tually all the runs before they reach the Indians' customary fishing
grounds; and (2) by authorizing degradation of environmental conditions
essential for fish survival. The litigation was bifurcated to resolve sepa-
rately the harvest management claims ("Phase I") and the habitat degra-
dation claims ("Phase II").
1. Phase I: The Right to Harvest
In Phase I, Judge George H. Boldt followed the court's lead in
Sohappy v. Smith. By interpreting the "in common" language of the Ste-
vens Treaties to require equal sharing between Indian and non-Indian
fishermen, Judge Boldt determined that fifty percent of each fish run des-
tined for or passing through traditional tribal fishing areas should be allo-
cated to treaty tribes. 46 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
agreed. 47 Like the district court, it held that state power to regulate treaty
fisheries was limited to non-discriminatory measures reasonable and nec-
essary for conservation. The court analogized tribal and state interests in
the fishery to a cotenancy and said "neither the treaty Indians nor the state
on behalf of its citizens may permit the subject matter of these treaties to
be destroyed.' '48
The Supreme Court affirmed Judge Boldt's allocation of fifty percent
of each run destined for the tribes' usual and accustomed fishing places,
46. The Phase I litigation has produced several reported opinions. The initial decision is United
States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). Various Post-Trial Decisions, entered in 1978, are reported at
United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash. 1978); appeals from these decisions
were dismissed, 573 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1978), 573 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1978), 573 F.2d 1121 (9th
Cir. 1978). The Post-Trial Decisions were affirmed sub nom. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v.
United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978), affd in part, vacated in part, and re-
manded sub nom. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658 (1979) (Fishing Vessel).
47. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1086 (1976).
48. Id. at 685.
365
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relying on the precise language of the treaty. 49 The critical language was
the "in common" phrase. The Supreme Court noted:
The logic of the 50% ceiling is manifest. For an equal division-espe-
cially between parties who presumptively treated with each other as
equals-is suggested, if not necessarily dictated, by the word "common"
as it appears in the treaties. Since the days of Solomon, such a division has
been accepted as a fair apportionment of a common asset, and Anglo-Amer-
ican common law has presumed that division when, as here, no other per-
centage is suggested by the language of the agreement or the surrounding
circumstances. 50
Not only was there substantial common law support for this interpreta-
tion, particularly in international law, 51 there was evidence that Indians
understood the division would be of equal shares. Chinook jargon, the
trade medium used to negotiate the treaties, had a vocabulary limited to
300 words, making translation and negotiation inexact at best. But evi-
dence from the time of the treaties suggests that "in common with" im-
plied a concept of equal sharing. 52
While the Supreme Court settled that the tribes reserved up to half of
their traditional 1854-1855 fisheries, there is still judicial confusion about
the "floor" of the tribes' right at any given time. Perhaps this "floor"
can be found in the Court's interpretation that the treaty secured enough
fish to meet the tribes' "moderate living" needs. 53 If this is the case the
tribes are not "guaranteed" any fixed percentage of the runs, but rather
are entitled to a quantity of the resource sufficient for their present and
future needs. 54 Absent proof that tribes could no longer "reasonably"
need half of their treaty time resource, non-Indians cannot usurp the
tribes' treaty-secured share for any reason. 55
2. Phase H: The Right to Fishery Habitat Protection
Having a guaranteed right to fish, the Indians presumably would have a
49. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979) (Fishing Vessel).
50. Id. at 686 n.27.
51. See id. at 677 n.23 (noting that the United States has used "in common with" language in
treaties with Britain, giving each signatory an "equal" and "apportionable" share of fish in treaty
areas).
52. Id. at 667 n.10; see also United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 355-56 (W.D.
Wash 1974).
53. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 686. The appropriate interpretation of this "moderate living"
concept is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 96-127.
54. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 686-87. The guarantee is analogous to judicial doctrine in the
area of reserved water rights. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-601 (1963).
55. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 687.
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right to protect the fish resource from destruction. Even before the Ste-
vens Treaties were negotiated, courts recognized a right of the general
public to be protected from fish loss caused by human alterations of the
environment. For example, in Stoughton v. Baker,56 the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that a grant of the right to build a dam carried with it
an implied duty to provide passage for fish. 57 Courts have also recognized
causes of action in nuisance by state governments or fishermen to prevent
degradation of water conditions essential for fish survival. 58 Both state
governments, as parens patriae, and ordinary fishermen may have causes
of action for money damages in the event fish are destroyed by environ-
mental degradation. 59
Before the Phase II decisions, it had been held that because the treaty
fishing right is a property interest, the United States must compensate
tribes for damaging treaty fisheries by government projects. For example,
in Whitefoot v. United States,60 the court recognized that because Con-
gress chose to allow fish loss by authorizing construction of the Dalles
Dam on the Columbia River, it also had to compensate the affected treaty
tribe. 61
Moreover, declaratory and injunctive relief had also been awarded to
protect the habitat of treaty fisheries. In 1973, the Umatilla Tribe obtained
a court order requiring the Bonneville Power Administration and the
Army Corps of Engineers to operate the Federal Columbia River Power
56. 4 Mass. 521,528 (1808).
57. Id. at 528. See also Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 500, 520 (1872) (state
authorization to build a dam carries with it an implied obligation to provide passage for fish); Cottrill
v. Myrick, 12 Me. 222, 229-31 (1835) (legislature has power to require landowners who erect or
maintain dams to provide passage for fish); Commonwealth v. Chapin, 22 Mass. 203, 206-09, 5
Pick. 199 (1827) (landowners who erect or maintain dams have implied duty to provide passage for
fish); State v. Roberts, 59 N.H. 256, 257 (1879) ("the right to have migratory fish pass in their
accustomed course up and down rivers and streams is a public right").
58. See People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 116 Cal. 397, 48 P. 374 (1897) (nuisance action brought
by state); Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v. St. Helens, 160 Or. 654, 87 P.2d 195,
198 (1939) (nuisance action brought by fishermen).
59. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (action for damages brought by
fishermen); Dep't of Fisheries v. Gillette, 27 Wn. App. 815, 621 P.2d 764 (1980) (action for dam-
ages brought by state). Unlike ordinary fishermen, Indian fisherman would have faced many obsta-
cles, at treaty time, if they had to rely on whatever protection state common law or statutes provided
for their fish habitat. For Indians, suing in state courts was problematic. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 162-63 (1948); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). The commu-
nal nature of their fishing right might have limited remedies of individual fishermen to suits by the
tribe. Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 818 (1962).
But, the tribe's right to sue without congressional authorization was unclear. F. COHEN, supra, at
283-85.
60. 293 F.2d 658,659 & n.1, (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 818 (1962).
61. Id. at 660. See also Northern Paiute Nation v. United States, 30 Ind. Cf. Comm. 210 (1973)
(compensation required if federally-authorized water diversions diminished tribal fisheries).
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System so as not to "impair or destroy" their treaty fishing rights. 62 In
1977, a federal district court held that the Army Corps of Engineers was
not authorized to construct a dam and reservoir which would flood tradi-
tional tribal fishing sites and wipe out a steelhead run above the dam. 63
The Corps had planned to "mitigate" the harm by transporting chinook
salmon around the dam. The court rejected the Corps plan, however, be-
cause even with "mitigation" Indian fishing rights would be impaired,
and Congress had not authorized any impairment of treaty fishing
rights. 64
a. The Orrick Decision
In Phase II, Judge William H. Orrick concluded that state-authorized
degradation of essential fish habitat conditions could render the treaty
right just as meaningless as state harvest management had done. 65 Conse-
quently, he issued a declaratory judgment, ruling that the state could not
authorize habitat degradation that impairs treaty fishing rights. 66 While
Judge Orrick did not decide whether the state has violated the right, there
was no dispute that activities such as watershed alterations, storage dams,
and power development have caused fish runs to decline dramatically. 67
The court found that:
Were this trend to continue, the right to take fish would eventually be re-
duced to the right to dip one's net into the water. . . and bring it out empty.
Such result would render nugatory the nine-year effort in Phase I, sanc-
tioned by this Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court, to enforce
the treaties' reservation to the tribes of a sufficient quantity of fish to meet
their fair needs. The Supreme Court all but resolved the environmental issue
when it expressly rejected the State's contention, initially reiterated on this
motion, that the treaty right is but an equal opportunity to try to catch fish.
Rather, the Court held that the treaty assures the tribes something considera-
bly more tangible than "merely the chance ... occasionally to dip their nets
into the territorial waters." 68
Judge Orrick noted that treaty negotiators had reassured the tribes that
62. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Callaway, No. 72-211. slip op. at
7(D. Or. Aug. 17, 1973).
63. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553 (D.
Or. 1977).
64. Id. at 555-56.
65. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
66. Id. at 208.
67. Id. at 203.
68. Id. (citation omitted).
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they had nothing to fear from the increased non-Indian settlement of the
Puget Sound area.69He concluded:
[T]here can be no doubt that one of the paramount purposes of the treaties
in question was to reserve to the tribes the right to continue fishing as an
economic and cultural way of life. It is equally beyond doubt that the exis-
tence of an environmentally-acceptable habitat is essential to the survival of
the fish, without which the expressly-reserved right to take fish would be
meaningless and valueless. Thus, it is necessary to recognize an implied
environmental right in order to fulfill the purposes of the fishing clause. 70
The state argued that it was unnecessary to imply an environmental
right because of numerous federal and state programs designed to protect
fish habitat. 71 But Judge Orrick held that the adequacy of state laws was a
remedies question and that these laws were irrelevant to the scope of the
treaty right possessed by the tribes. 72
To determine the quantity of fish which must be available to the tribes,
Judge Orrick adopted the Supreme Court's moderate living needs con-
cept, ruling that the state, as well as the United States and third parties,
must refrain from degrading fish habitat to the extent that tribes could not
meet their moderate living needs by fishing. 73 How many fish is that? In
his Amended Judgment, filed January 16, 1981, he clarified that future
development must protect the current amount of fish the tribes are entitled
to under the Phase I allocation orders. 74
69. Id. at 204.
70. Id. at 205.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 205-06. Although the judge left that remedies question for later determination, there is
substantial evidence in the record regarding state-authorized habitat degradation. For example, sev-
eral state officials responsible for fish management conceded, during discovery, that a number of
non-federal dams remain complete or partial obstructions to fish migration despite a long standing
state law requiring adequate fish passage facilities. See WASH. REv. CODE § 75.20.060 (1982). The
state officials' testimony may be found in Plaintiffs' Exhibit (PE) 11 at 75; PE 22 at 20 (plaintiffs'
second set of interrogatories with defendants' responses). See also 506 F. Supp. at 205 n.67; UNITED
STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., WASH. DEPT. OF FISHERIES AND WASH. DEPT. OF GAME, JOINT
STATEMENT REGARDING THE BIOLOGY. STATUS, MANAGEMENT, AND HARVEST OF THE SALMON AND
STEELHEAD RESOURCES OF PUGET SOUND AND OLYMPIC PENINSULAR DRAINAGE AREA OF WESTERN
WASHINGTON 22-25 (1973); I WASH. DEPT. OF FISHERIES, A CATALOG OF WASHINGTON STREAMS AND
SALMON UTILIZATION 13 (19XX).
Judge Orrick did provide some guidance on enforcement of the treaty habitat protection right. He
listed five conditions which the parties agreed were the minimum conditions essential for survival of
salmon and steelhead: (1) access to and from the sea; (2) an adequate supply of good-quality water;
(3) a sufficient amount of suitable gravel for spawning and egg incubation; (4) an ample supply of
food; and (5) sufficient shelter. 506 F. Supp. at 203.
73. Id. at 208.
74. The amended judgment provided that the state obligation was to refrain from impairing tribal
"moderate living needs, as implemented through the allocation orders of the District Court in Phase
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According to the district court, when proposed activities are chal-
lenged, the tribes must bear the initial burden of proving that fish habitat
would be degraded "such that rearing or production potential of the fish
will be impaired or the size or quality of the run will be diminished." 75
The state would then bear the burden of showing that the damage will not
occur, that the fish loss will be adequately mitigated, that non-treaty fish-
eries will absorb the loss, or that for some other reason, the tribes will still
be able to harvest their treaty share. 76
b. The Ninth Circuit Decision In Phase H
Concerned about the ramifications of the treaty right to resource protec-
tion and displeased with the vague and confusing "moderate living"
standard, the Ninth Circuit panel that heard Phase II sought to apply its
own concepts of equity to measure the right. Unfortunately, the court
only further confused the issue by adopting a test of "reasonableness"
with a number of qualifications. 77 The court in its analysis commits the
very mistakes it attributed to the district court, and in reaching its conclu-
sions seems oblivious to the rules of treaty interpretation, prior Supreme
Court cases on the Stevens Treaties, and the reserved tribal rights doc-
trine.
Attempting to draw an analogy to options and other such unrelated
"rights," the court said the tribes did not actually "secure" any quantity
of fish; rather, they obtained only a just share of the resource. 78 The court
stopped short of the logical conclusion of its analysis: that the treaty-se-
cured fish supply can be purposely and totally destroyed by non-Indians
without violating the treaty right. The Supreme Court, of course, repeat-
edly emphasized in Fishing Vessel that the tribes did not reserve fifty per-
cent of potentially nothing. 79 The Ninth Circuit panel stated that Indians
and non-Indians must share equally the losses from "reasonable," "non-
discriminatory development. "80 In its analysis, the court failed to con-
sider adequately the crucial difference between the risk of fish loss from a
natural disaster and fish loss by human interference. While the tribes did
not reserve a right to be protected from acts of God or to harvest more
than they needed, and in that sense did not reserve a specific quantity of
I." United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), amended judgment, slip.
op. at 3 (W..D. Wash., Jan. 16, 1981).
75. 506 F. Supp. at 208 (emphasis added).
76. See id.
77. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374, 1375 (9th Cir. 1982).
78. Id. at 1380-82, 1384.
79. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
80. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d at 1385-87.
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fish, the treaty clearly was intended to protect them from non-Indian ap-
propriation of reserved tribal fish supplies. 81
On the other hand, the court agreed with the district court that the Ste-
vens Treaties impose their own "environmental restraints on activities in
the case area."82 In light of the undisputed degradation that has occurred,
it found that federal and state governments have a duty to take "reason-
able" steps not only to preserve and mitigate, but also to enhance. 83 Fur-
ther, the court expected that the reasonable steps taken will be "commen-
surate" not only with state and federal resources, but also with available
technology. 84 The appeals court also noted that the state's choice of de-
velopment sites could not discriminate against Indian fisheries, a likely
possibility for hydro development, since hydro projects often directly im-
pact river fisheries, which have unique importance to Indian tribes. 85
Whether the panel's decision in Phase II will be modified is yet to be
seen. As it now stands, the ruling recognizes that the treaties provide an
independent legal basis for mandating habitat protection for treaty fish-
eries. Nevertheless, it leaves many unanswered questions about the pre-
cise scope of the right. It may be, as Judge Reinhardt stated in his concur-
ring opinion, that, as a practical matter, the panel's decision will require
the same restraint as that declared by the district court. 86
D. Other Recent Decisions and Pending Cases Regarding Tribal Fish
Protection Rights
The federal government, a plaintiff in the Phase II litigation, is also
subject to the treaty habitat protection right. 87 In a pending lawsuit chal-
lenging federal authorizations for the Northern Tier pipeline, the United
States has been held to a duty" 'to refrain from degrading the fish habitat
to an extent that would deprive the tribes of their moderate living
needs.' "88 The court ruled that the tribes were entitled to an evidentiary
81. See generally supra text accompanying notes 26-36 (discussing the background of the treaty
rights).
82. 694F.2dat 1381.
83. Id. at 1375, 1389.
84. Id. at 1386.
85. Id. at 1382, 1387. The Supreme Court has noted that the state may not impose seemingly
non-discriminatory regulations that have the effect of denying the tribes their treaty share. Fishing
Vessel, 443 U.S. at 682-683 (discussing the state's attempted "total ban on commercial net fishing
for steelhead"). The treaty right is to be protected on a river-by-river, run-by-run basis. Id. at 685;
Hoh v. Baldridge, 522 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Wash. 198 1).
86. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d at 1390 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 1375 n.1.
88. No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 371-72 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (quoting United States
v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 208 (W.D. Wash. 1980)).
Washington Law Review
hearing on their claims that the United States had violated both the treaty
rights and the obligations of a trustee charged with protecting tribal fish-
eries. Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation, 89 another
recent Ninth Circuit decision, further confirms the federal government's
habitat protection obligation under the Stevens Treaties. In that case,
farmers and local irrigation districts relying on federally constructed and
operated irrigation systems, along with the federal agencies administering
the irrigation programs, were held bound by the treaties. 90
Other cases also implement this habitat protection right. On July 13,
1979, Federal District Court Judge Jack Tanner granted a tribe's motion
for a preliminary injunction to halt county vegetation removal in the Puy-
allup watershed because of potential harm to fisheries. 91 On August 5,
1981, the City of Seattle surrendered its preliminary permit to construct
the Copper Creek hydro project on the Skagit River because of treaty fish-
ing rights claims and strong public opposition. 92 Recent interim agree-
ments on flow regulation below dams and studies on fish impacts are de-
signed to provide substantial protection to tribal fisheries. 93 The
Snohomish County, Washington Public Utility District recently settled
certain treaty right claims arising from a hydroelectric project by agreeing
to pay $1 million to the tribe for mitigation and fish enhancement pur-
poses.94 At least two other lawsuits are pending against operators of hy-
droelectric projects which affect treaty fisheries. 95
89. Nos. 80-3505, 81-3002, 81-3068, 81-3069, slip op. (9th Cir. Sept 16, 1982).
90. Id. at 5.
91. Puyallup Tribe v. Stortine, W.D. Wash No. C79-269T.
92. 46 Fed. Reg. 40,255 (1981).
93. City of Seattle, Washington, Project No. 553, 15 FERC 61,328 (1981) (Ross Dam-Skagit
River); City of Tacoma, Washington, Project No. P- 1865, 4 FERC 65,290 (1978) (Alder-LaGrande
Dam-Nisqually River).
94. In re Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Project No. 2157 (Settlement
Agreement before the United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Feb. 16, 1982) (copy
on file with the Washington Law Review).
95. In Muckleshoot Tribe v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., No. 472-72C2 (W.D. Wash. filed
July 18, 1972), the Muckleshoot Tribe is asserting both its Winters right and treaty fishing rights in
seeking declaratory, injunctive and compensatory damage relief from the Buckley hydro diversion.
Puget's project has, since 1911, shunted almost all the flow of the White River around the Muck-
leshoot Reservation. The suit, filed in 1972, was held in abeyance while the parties litigated whether
the project needs a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) license. FERC jurisdiction over
the project has been upheld on the basis of navigability, as demonstrated primarily through photo-
graphs and court records of shingle bolt flotation and canoe travel. See Puget Sound Power & Light
Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 644 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1053
(1981). In the pending lawsuit, the tribe is asserting a prior and paramount tribal water right for
maintaining the White River fishery. The tribe is also relying on Minnesota v. United States, 305
U.S. 382 (1939), to claim that a state court had no jurisdiction to condemn its Winters rights or to
authorize a diversion of water needed for treaty fishing.
A similar case is Nisqually Indian Tribe v. Centralia, No. C75-31T (W.D. Wash. May 15, 1981)
(order denying motion to dismiss and granting motion to amend complaint), in which the Nisqually
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III. THE MEASURE OF TRIBAL RIGHTS
A. A Right to Preserve Enough of the Resource for Present and Future
Tribal Needs
The Ninth Circuit panel in Phase II discarded the Supreme Court's
moderate living standard as unworkable, in favor of a reasonableness
test.96 While the Supreme Court's phraseology was unfortunate, the
Ninth Circuit panel discarded the baby along with the bath water and
overlooked what was the crucial point: tribes who reserved rights in a
natural resource have a right to a quantity of that resource, measured by
both their present and potential needs, and not subordinate to other priori-
ties.
When the Supreme Court spoke of a "moderate living" floor to the
quantity of fish to which the tribes are entitled under the treaties, it clearly
intended to apply the principles it had earlier articulated in cases on re-
served tribal water rights. 97 In those cases, balancing, or weighing Indian
interests against other priorities or concerns, was expressly rejected as an
inappropriate way to measure the amount of water available for tribal
use. 98 In quantifying tribal water rights, the Supreme Court has looked to
the purposes of the reservation and adopted a standard most consistent
with tribal expectations and, presumably, honorable dealings on the part
of the United States. As early as 1908, the Supreme Court explained the
controlling principle used to determine the scope of reserved tribal rights
in a natural resource. In Winters v. United States,99 non-Indian water ap-
propriators relying on state law were enjoined from taking that quantity of
water which the Indians might use to make their reservation produc-
tive. 100
Tribe is asserting its treaty fishing rights. The suit was started on February 15, 1975, but had also
been delayed while the tribe participated in related FERC proceedings. Judge Tanner rejected argu-
ments that the tribe's claims could be barred by state statutes of limitation and pre-suit notification
requirements.
96. The Ninth Circuit panel stated:
The treaties do not, however, guarantee an adequate supply of fish to meet the Tribes' moderate
living needs. Nor do they create an absolute right to relief from all State or State-authorized
environmental degradation of the fish habitat that interferes with a tribe's moderate living needs.
Rather, we find that when considering projects that may have a significant environmental im-
pact, both the State and the Tribes must take reasonable steps commensurate with the respective
resources and abilities of each to preserve and enhance the fishery. Both share in the beneficial
use of a fragile resource. Each to the other owes this obligation.
United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d at 1375 (footnote omitted).
97. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 685-86.
98. See supra note 17.
99. 207 U.S. 564 (1908)
100. In that case, the Supreme Court said:
The Indians had command of the lands and the waters,-command of all their beneficial use,
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The Winters Doctrine 01 was founded on the idea that the land reserva-
tions were intended to provide tribes an opportunity for self-sufficiency.
The tribes were to retain that quantity and quality of the water resources
flowing through or along their reservations which they needed to continue
their traditional ways of livelihood as well as develop new ones.
102
Hence, they reserved the resource for both its present and future use. Be-
cause the preservation of fish is no less important to the tribes of the Pa-
cific Northwest than the preservation of water for irrigation was to the
Indians in Winters, the same analysis should be applied to both resources.
As the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Winans, 103 fish "were not
much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere
they breathed." 104
In quantifying tribal water rights, the Supreme Court has, therefore,
adopted a tribal needs standard. Since the measure of tribal needs must be
consistent with the purpose of the right-permanent tribal self-suffici-
ency-the Supreme Court has expressly refused to measure tribal needs
based on the current number of Indians or other factors which might re-
strict the tribe's full development of the reserved resource's potential. 1
05
Thus the rights are quantified on the basis of the full production potential
of the resource. In the case of water rights for agricultural development,
that has meant measuring the amount of reserved water flow on the basis
of "practicably irrigable acreage." 06 When water rights have been re-
served for fishing purposes, 107 the logical application of these principles
whether kept for hunting, and "grazing roving herds of stock," or turned to agriculture and the
arts of civilization. Did they give up all this? Did they reduce the area of their occupation and
give up the waters which made it valuable or adequate? .... If it were possible to believe affirma-
tive answers, we might also believe that the Indians were awed by the power of the government
or deceived by its negotiators. Neither view is possible. The government is asserting the rights
of the Indians. But extremes need not be taken into account. By a rule of interpretation of agree-
ments and treaties with the Indians, ambiguities occurring will be resolved from the standpoint
of the Indians. And the rule should certainly be applied to determine between two inferences,
one of which would support the purpose of the agreement and the other impair or defeat it. On
account of their relations to the government, it cannot be supposed that the Indians were alert to
exclude by formal words every inference which might militate against or defeat the declared
purpose of themselves and the Government ....
207 U.S. at 576-77.
101. See supra note 10.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 26-36.
103. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
104. Id. at 381.
105. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599-600 (1963).
106. Id. at 600; 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 588-89.
107. See, e.g., Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 642 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); United States v. Anderson, 6 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW,
TRAINING PROGRAM) F-129 (E.D. Wash. July 23, 1979), 9 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAIN-
ING PROGRAM) 3137 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 1982).
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is to measure the water right by the spawning, rearing and migration po-
tential of the particular waterway involved. The Stevens Treaties fishing
rights should therefore be measured by habitat "production potential." 108
B. "Moderate Living": A Duty to Prevent Waste
In the body of law on reserved tribal water rights, there is reference to a
reasonableness standard in measuring the right. 109 Courts, however, have
used the reasonableness standard to halt water appropriation which was
not necessary for crop productivity, and have distinguished wasteful prac-
tices from use of water reasonably needed for economic gain. 110 The con-
cept of "reasonable" needs has therefore served, in the case of water
rights, to prevent inefficient, wasteful appropriation, rather than profit po-
tential. The concept can also serve to allow non-Indians to use water that
tribes could not possibly put to use in the present, so long as the non-
Indian appropriation does not permanently deprive the Indians of the wa-
ter they might need in the future. 11
This concept of preventing unnecessary waste has also been applied to
Stevens Treaties' fishing rights. In Phase I, the district court expressed
concern with preventing both overutilization and underutilization of the
fish resource. 112 But, in allowing non-Indians to harvest fish that Indians
could not possibly catch because of their current numbers or available
gear, the court was not authorizing permanent destruction of a fish supply
which tribes might be able to use in the future. In its harvest management
rulings, the court was very concerned that the crop was not overharvested
and that fish runs were not prevented from perpetuating themselves. 113
108. Cf. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 208 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (plaintiff
must bear initial burden of proving that state's planned environmental degradation will impair the
"production potential" of the fish run; thereafter the state must demontrate that any degradation
would not deprive the tribes of their moderate living needs).
109. United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 337 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 988 (1957). Reasonableness, however, was a standard for measuring the needs for the
resource and consequently the right, not a standard for balancing one person's needs against an-
other's. Compare the Ninth Circuit Phase II opinion, supra text accompanying notes 77-86 (Indians
and non-Indians must share losses from "reasonable development").
110. See United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d at 340-41; Vineyard Land & Stock
Co. v. Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water Co., 245 F. 9, 22-25 (9th Cir. 1917); Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 257-58 (D.D.C. 1973).
I11. United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d at 326-27; 1982 HANDBOOK, supra
note 12, at 595-96.
112. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 384-85 (W.D. Wash. 1974), affd. 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975) ("while an over-harvest would impair its renewability, an under-harvest
during a limited time it is available would result in an irreplaceable waste of the resource").
113. United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020, 1108-09 (W.D. Wash. 1978), affd sub.
nom. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir.), affd in
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It is with this precedent in mind that one must approach the interpreta-
tion of the Supreme Court's "moderate living" standard. It would have
been more precise, and more consistent with prior precedent, to say that
Indians are not permitted to waste the resource. In this sense the tribal
right is subject to moderation. Thus, non-Indians may use, temporarily,
the Indian half of the fish resource that exceeds the Indians' current
needs. But non-Indians cannot now, or at any time in the future, perma-
nently usurp or damage any fraction of the tribes' property interest in the
fish supply that the treaties secured as the primary means of tribal self-
sufficiency and cultural cohesion. 114
C. "Moderate Living": A Tribal Right to the Full Economic Potential
of its Reserved Share
The Supreme Court's concern that tribes not be permitted to preempt
fish resources which they could "not possibly use" is evident in its guide-
lines for future downward adjustments in the current fifty-fifty allocation
of runs destined for traditional tribal fisheries. 115 Allocation reductions
require a showing of a drastic change in the treaty status or needs. And
present inability to harvest their maximum entitlement would not neces-
sarily justify permanent reduction of the Indian fish supply.
The concerns expressed by the Ninth Circuit about a "moderate liv-
ing" standard lose force when the underlying concept is applied. The var-
iability of present tribal needs is not a real problem because the habitat
potential that the tribes reserved is the proper guide.
"Moderate living" was, nonetheless, an ill-advised choice of words. It
is doubtful that the Supreme Court intended to say that tribes had some-
how, unwittingly, committed themselves forever to a middle-class stan-
dard of living, or some other limitation on enjoying the full fruits of their
labor. That would certainly be contrary to the "American way." That
principle could easily lead to a double standard, whereby non-Indian fish-
ermen, fish processors, retailers and charter boat operators and state fish
licensing and taxing entities are unlimited in the revenue they can reap
from the non-treaty fish share, but the Indians have to find some other
way besides harvesting and marketing and regulating fish to achieve the
great American dream.
part, vacated in part, and remanded sub. nom. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Pas-
senger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
114. It is therefore important to distinguish non-Indians' permissible uses of the two halves of the
fish resource. The non-Indians are free to do anything with the non-treaty share, including destroying
it permanently. But they may only harvest temporarily the renewable portion of the treaty half that is
not being used by the tribes.
115. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 686-87.
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At treaty time, tribes were surrounded by a bountiful resource, and ex-
panding markets for their fish. 116 There is no evidence that a lid was being
placed on the economic potential of their reserved share. While the Su-
preme Court spoke of a moderate living standard, it also seemed to recog-
nize that Indians would not have anticipated such a restriction on their
fishing activities. 117 The Supreme Court's real concern, apparent from the
example it gave as a possible justification for a reduction in the treaty
share, 18 seems not to be that tribes might make maximum use of the
profit potential of their treaty share. Rather, its concern appeared to be
that circumstances might so drastically change some day as to make a
fifty percent allocation of the resource to them inappropriate by any rea-
sonable standard, and cause wastage, or underutilization by fishermen of
the resource. 119 The Court wanted to make clear that the fifty percent allo-
cation was not a guaranteed percentage, but a ceiling.120 The ceiling,
however, is on the number of fish that tribes .can put to reasonable use,
not on the profits they can reap from their share.
Not surprisingly, adversaries in litigation with tribes have latched on to
the "moderate living" idea and have bombarded tribes with discovery
requests about individual and tribal income and needs, and past and pre-
sent fish catch statistics, in an effort to reduce the entitlement. 121 Lawyers
could have a heyday in arguing over what "moderate" means and what
factors enter into its equation. 22 Even assuming for the moment that
some profit restriction was intended, it is puzzling why anyone would
even suggest that tribes are presently exceeding their moderate living
needs. It should be obvious that Northwest fishing tribes are not enjoying
a moderate living standard by any reasonable criteria. At the February 5,
116. B. Lane, Political and Economic Aspects of Indian-White Culture Contact in Western
Washington in the Mid-19th Century 11-13 (May 10, 1973) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file
with the Washington Law Review).
117. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 668 n.12.
118. Id. at 687.
119. Id.
120. Id. at686&n.27.
121. See, e.g., Muckleshoot Tribe v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., No. 472-72C2 (W.D.
Wash. filed July 18, 1972).
122. The range of considerations possibly relevant to a tribal needs assessment under a "moder-
ate living" standard is broad. For example, is only income derived directly from harvesting fish to be
considered? Or is any fish-related income to be taken into account, including guide services, gear
production and sales, processing, etc.? Is income derived from non-fish related sources to be consid-
ered? Does the answer to the last question depend on whether those tribal members with other sources
of income would fish if more fish were available? What about tribal income? Which tribal govern-
mental services supported by that income meet "moderate" living needs? Defining "moderate" is
itself a complicated matter. What is the proper standard of comparison: the annual average earnings
of the "middle class?" Would judges, doctors, lawyers, or corporate executives consider their earn-
ings "excessive?" The ramifications for discovery and counter-discovery by tribes to arrive at a
reasonable standard for comparison are only limited by lawyers' creativity.
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1982 hearing of the Phase II appeal, for example, the state conceded the
dubiousness of claiming that tribes do not need the current allocation and
pointed to current economic conditions suggesting that the tribe's fish
supply was particularly important to them now. The state's own data re-
futes the suggestion that fifty percent of the current fish supply exceeds
tribal needs or that it is satisfying the treaty purpose of promoting tribal
self-sufficiency. 12 3
In the Phase II decision, Judge Orrick interpreted the fact that the allo-
cation was set at the treaty maximum as suggesting that tribal needs were
not being met by the present number of harvestable fish. 124 And, in Phase
I, Judge Boldt had no problem in allocating the full fifty percent of the
current reserved runs to the tribes, noting that "a substantial number of
tribal members [are] at or near poverty level." 125 The United States has
also recognized the tribes' need for their full allocation of all available
fish. 126
It would be highly questionable for any federally established agency or
council implementing the Northwest Power Act to take suddenly a con-
trary position. Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court's use of the "mod-
erate living" language is best considered ill-advised dicta. The "moder-
ate" standard, if applied, should be done so consistent with prior
precedent limiting uses of natural resources to productive uses and prohi-
biting waste. The proper measure of the right is half of the habitat's natu-
123. According to a state study published four years after the trial court decision in Phase I.
Indians living on or adjacent to the Lower Elwha Reservation had an unemployment rate of 53.2%.
More than half of those employed earned less than $5,000 per year. At Port Gamble, the unemploy-
ment rate was 44.5%, with more than half of the employed earning less than $5,000 per year. Similar
statistics for other Washington tribes underscore their impoverished condition. See OmcE OF PRO-
GRAM RESEARCH. WASHINGTON STATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. WASHINGTON STATE AND ITS RES.
ERVATION-BASED INDIAN TRIBES 24-44 (1978).
124. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 208 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
125. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
126. The United States recently summarized the tribes' situation, in arguing to the Ninth Circuit
the validity of the right to hatchery fish which are being propagated in part to replace natural fish
destroyed by environmental degradation:
It is an undeniable fact that the fishery is restricted because the demand for fish exceeds the
available supply, and therefore it is necessary to place a 50% ceiling on the Indian share whether
or not the moderate living standard is exceeded. Given these conditions, a distinction between
naturally spawned and hatchery fish on the basis of program funding or fishery management is
meaningless. The district court correctly determined that the 50% ceiling did not currently sat-
isfy the Indian moderate living needs. . . . Until such time as the supply exceeds those needs,
every fish regardless of origin taken in tribal historic fishing grounds should count as part of the
Indian allocation. If hatchery runs did no more than supplement an abundant supply, there
would be adequate leeway for management in favor of special interest groups or other purposes
desired by the State.
Brief for Appellee United States at 35, United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982)
(emphasis added and citation omitted) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
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ral production potential. 127 The present treaty share is not enough to meet
tribal needs. It seems a waste of time to speculate now about what was
required by prior generations of Indians, or might be required by future
generations.
IV. THE NORTHWEST POWER ACT AND THE TRUST
RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Role of the Federal Government
The Northwest Power Planning Council, as a delegee of federal author-
ity, 128 and federal agencies, such as the Bonneville Power Administra-
tion, that are responsible for the Northwest Power Act's implementa-
tion, 129 must, of course, bear in mind the special obligations of the
federal government in protecting treaty-secured resources. Treaties secur-
ing property interests for Indians impose a strict fiduciary obligation on
the United States in dealing with those interests, commonly referred to as
the federal "trust responsibility." 130 Trust obligations to Indians are also
derived from the general "guardian-ward" relationship between the fed-
eral government and Indian people. 131
The trust responsibility applies to all federal agencies, not just the De-
partment of Interior or the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 132 While Congress
127. Use of the word "natural" here is not intended to suggest that the treaty right would not
allow tribes to engage in artificial production of fish and share in the results. The district court and the
Ninth Circuit in Phase II ruled that the Stevens Treaties right extends to hatchery fish, and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that reserved tribal water rights can be used for a "replace-
ment" fishery. Confederated Colville Tribe v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981). "Natural," as used in this article, is intended to refer to the production potential
of a waterway in its pristine state, unencumbered by man's post-treaty habitat degradation.
128. The council is an eight-member body composed of two representatives each from Idaho,
Montana, Oregon, and Washington. The Council's purpose is to develop a twenty-year regional plan
to govern the region's electricity future. See Northwest Power Act, supra note 1, § 4(e), 16 U.S.C.
839b (Supp. V 1981).
129. For a general discussion of the responsibilities for implementing the Northwest Power Act,
see Mellem, Darkness to Dawn? Generating and Conserving Electricity in the Pacific Northwest: A
Primer on the Northwest PowerAct, 58 WASH. L. REv. XXX (1983).
130. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (United States is
charged "with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust").
131. United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1935); United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375,383-84 (1886); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
132. Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1982) (any
federal government action is subject to the United States' fiduciary responsibility to Indians); White
v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1978) (HEW responsible for providing mental health care for
Indians).
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may be able to authorize destruction of Indian property, federal agencies
cannot. 133
A tribe is "entitled to rely on the United States, its guardian, for
needed protection of its interests." 134 The tribe is not required to prove to
what extent and how its property needs protection. Federal agencies have
a duty to thoroughly investigate potential adverse impacts on treaty-se-
cured resources and not simply make a "judgment call," or balance com-
peting interests, in choosing the appropriate course of action. 1 35
The government's trust duties have been held to include a duty to pre-
vent diversion of water needed for a tribal fishery.136 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently described the duty to protect tribal fisheries as
one demanding "undivided loyalty." 137 The government's duty is partic-
ularly great when it has an interest in the Indian property it is manag-
ing. 138 The trust responsibility has also been held to require strict compli-
ance with administrative policies, such as consultation with Indians, that
are intended to protect Indian interests. 139
Ordinarily, the federal trustee must exercise at least the level of care
required of a private fiduciary. 140 If, however, the trustee has greater
skills or knowledge than the ordinary person, he must use all the skill and
knowledge at his disposal. 141 The standard of performance need not be
limited by treaty or statute, if common law trust principles impose a
higher standard. 142 The courts have repeatedly said that the common law
133. See Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1919), 1982 HANDBOOK. supra note
12, at 517.
134. United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935).
135. Pyramid Lake Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.D.C. 1973). The District of
Columbia Circuit has held that compliance with the procedural requirements of environmental protec-
tion laws and similar statutes, which permit a balancing of interests, may satisfy the trust responsibil-
ity. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 593, 611-13 (D.C. Cir. 1980): California v.
Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1329-35 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But no treaty right was involved in those cases.
136. United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1981). modified,
666 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 205 (1982); Pyramid Lake Tribe v. Morton, 354 F.
Supp. 252 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Northern Paiute Nation v. United States. 30 Ind. Cl. Comm. 210
(1973).
137. United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286. 1306 (9th Cir. 1980).
modified, 666 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 205 (1982). See also Navajo Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 364 F. 2d 320, 322-24 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
138. Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 364 F.2d 320, 323 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
139. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979).
140. United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 364 F.2d 320, 322-24 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Menominee Tribe v. United States. 101 Ct. Cl. 10.
19-20(1944).
141. Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D.
Cal. 1973).
142. Eric v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 464 F.
Supp. 44 (D. Alaska 1978).
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trust responsibility toward Indians and their property must be judged by
the "most exacting fiduciary standards." 143
Even if the Northwest Power Act had not directed restoration and en-
hancement of fisheries, tribes could claim such relief through litigation.
The treaty "right of taking fish" 144 is, after all, a property right. 145 Like
any other property owner, the tribes would be entitled to monetary dam-
ages and/or equitable relief, such as restoration or mitigation, once they
proved actual loss or potential harm.146 Neither Judge Boldt nor Judge
Orrick "created" some new, prospective right. 147 They merely inter-
preted treaties which have been in existence since 1854-1855.
The Ninth Circuit specifically recognized a treaty right to enhance-
ment. 148 The degree to which restoration or enhancement is required de-
pends, of course, on how much of the treaty share has been damaged. The
extent of loss need not be proved with mathematical certainty. The "best
available evidence," or any "rational basis" will be sufficient. 149 Expert
143. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. at 296-97; see United States v. Creek Nation,
295 U.S. 103, 110 (1934); Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d 36, 45 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Indians of the
Mancopa-Akchin Reservation v. United States, 667 F.2d 980 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Oneida Tribe of Indians
of Wisconsin v. United States, 165 Ct. C. 487,493 (1964).
144. Cf. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 678 (similar emphasis added to stress that the treaty guaran-
teed that a substantial volume of fish would be permitted to reach tribal fishing areas).
145. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F. 2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir.
1978); United States v. Washington, 520 F. 2d 677, 685 (9th Cir. 1975).
146. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (loss of hunting
and fishing rights); United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286, 1298, 1305 (9th
Cir. 1981) (water rights), modified, 666 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 314 (1982);
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553 (D. Or.
1977) (fishing rights); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973) (water
rights); Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Calloway, No. 72-211 (D. Or.
1973) (fishing rights); Northern Paiute Nation v. United States, 30 Ind. Cl. Comm. 210 (1973) (water
rights); Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl.) (fishing rights), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
818 (1963); Department of Fisheries v. Gillette, 27 Wn. App. 815, 621 P.2d 764 (1980) (fish).
147. In Nisqually Indian Tribe v. Centralia, an interlocutory dismissal of tribal claims for com-
pensation for destruction of treaty fisheries was ordered on the basis that Phase II of United States v.
Washington dealt only with prospective relief and that the treaties were not "self executing."
Nisqually Indian Tribe v. City of Centralia, No. C75-3 IT, at 4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 12, 1981) (order
granting motion to dismiss claim for money damages). Phase II, of course, has not reached the
remedies stage or even determined whether the state has violated the habitat protection right. United
States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 202 & n.57 (W.D. Wash. 1980). Whatever relief the tribes
seek against Washington State in Phase II does not preclude them from compensatory relief against
other parties. Furthermore, the Nisqually reasoning that the treaties were not self-executing is clearly
erroneous. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 693 n.33. The holding is also contrary to prior decisions
finding tribes entitled to monetary damages for destruction of reserved fisheries. See supra note 129.
148. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374, 1375 (9th Cir. 1982).
149. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1931);
Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 569 (9th Cir. 1974); Olympia Oyster Co. v. Rayonier, Inc.,
229 F. Supp. 855, 861 (W.D. Wash. 1964).
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opinion regarding the extent of lost habitat production potential may suf-
fice. 150
Providing for artificial production may not be adequate enhancement or
restoration of the fisheries. And simply allowing more habitat loss in the
hope hatcheries will compensate tribes would be a mistake. The past has
proved that reliance on hatchery fish is not the panacea it was once
thought to be. 151
B. The Role of the Tribal Governments
Essential to the negotiation of Indian treaties was the United States'
recognition that Northwest bands and villages were sovereign entities.
The courts, in interpreting the treaties, have been guided by the premise
that Indian treaties are "essentially a contract between two sovereign na-
tions." 152 While early concepts of tribal sovereignty seem to have been
somewhat eroded by the Supreme Court in recent years, 53 the scope of
tribal sovereignty remains broad. 54 When interpreting federal legislation
affecting Indians, the protection of tribal sovereignty is still a necessary
consideration. 155
Tribal sovereignty certainly extends to the management and regulation
of treaty-secured fisheries. In signing the Stevens Treaties, there was no
agreement that tribes would be divested of tribal control over them. 156
150. Carr v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 527, 535-37 (E.D. Va. 1955); Department of Fisheries
v. Gillette, 27 Wn. App. 815, 821-24, 621 P.2d 764,767-69 (1980).
151. In light of the importance of preserving the biological integrity and genetic diversity of
naturally spawning andromonous fish, Congressman Lowry and several other Congressional mem-
bers have introduced H.R. 7456, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The bill recognizes the problems that
have occurred in relying on hatchery fish stocks.
152. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675.
153. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (absent historical dependency on fish-
ery, or threat to political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of tribe, tribe may not
regulate non-Indian fishing on non-Indian land within Indian reservation); Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (tribal courts implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians).
154. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130. 152 (1982) (upholding tribal
authority to tax non-Indian lessees extracting oil and gas from trust land, even though federal govern-
ment was promoting energy development; Congress had given no "clear indications" that reserved
tribal rights were to be diminished); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136. 151
(1980) (state taxation of non-Indian logging held preempted by pervasive federal legislation and in-
consistent with tribal sovereignty); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reser-
vation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-53 (1980) (tribes possess "broad measure" of civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians on lands in which tribes have a significant interest); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez. 436 U.S.
49, 65 (1978) (tribe and its officers may not be sued for declaratory and injunctive relief): 1982
HANDBOOK. supra note 12, at 257.
155. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130. 152 (1982): McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n,411 U.S. 164, 172(1973).
156. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 668 n. 12.
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Tribal jurisdiction over fishing by members at off-reservation usual and
accustomed areas has been specifically upheld. 157 Jurisdiction over non-
Indian fishing on reservations has also been upheld where a sufficient tri-
bal interest could be demonstrated. 158 Non-Indian use of reservation wa-
ter resources would presumably fall within tribal control. 159 Even off-res-
ervation activities of non-Indians may be limited by tribal environmental
laws protective of reserved tribal resources. 160
Whatever the tribe's independent, sovereign authority over the fish-
eries, Congress has at least "delegated" tribes a veto power over future
salmon and steelhead management and enhancement plans. 161 The North-
west Power Act's fish planning provisions should be read together with
the Salmon and Steelhead Conservation and Enhancement Act of
1980.162 The Power Act expressly disclaims any diminution of tribal au-
thority. The Salmon and Steelhead Conservation and Enhancement Act
obviously intended future fish management and enhancement plans to be
subject to tribal concurrence. 163 Accordingly, the Regional Council
should defer to the fish management and enhancement recommendations
of the tribes.
C. Fish Scarcity: The Common Concern
To a large extent, the concern that prompted the Northwest Power
Act's fish provisions is the same concern that led to heated and lengthy
litigation over treaty fishing rights: a once abundant and valuable resource
157. Settlerv. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1980).
158. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 677 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1982); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1981); Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North
Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 588 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 446 U.S. 968
(1980).
159. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981). See also Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.)
(upholding tribal authority to regulate non-Indian riparian rights along a tribally owned lake bed,
including the construction of wharves, breakwaters, and similar structures), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
314(1982).
160. Nance v. EPA, 645 F. 2d 701, 715 (1981) ("a tribe may exercise control, in conjunction
with the EPA, over the entrance of pollutants into the reservation"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081
(1981). But see UNC Resource, Inc. v. Benally, 514 F. Supp. 385 (D.N. Mex. 1981) (tribal court
lacks authority to impose damages against non-Indians for spilling waste into lands occupied by Indi-
ans in "Indian Country," but outside boundaries of reservation).
161. Salmon and Steelhead Conservation and Enhancement Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3301,
3311(d), 3321(b) (Supp. V 1981). Cf. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) (semi-sover-
eign status of tribes justifies congressional delegation of federal power over non-Indians to tribal
governments).
162. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
163. 16U.S.C.§§3311(d),3321(b)(SuppV. 1981).
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has now become scarce. 164 Resolving ambiguities in the Act's fish protec-
tion measures in a manner consistent with the mandates of reserved tribal
rights is therefore justified, if for no other reason than that they share a
common purpose.
The fish and wildlife provisions of the Northwest Power Act reflect an
increasing public appreciation of the devastation wrought upon anadro-
mous fisheries by single-minded hydroelectric power development. 165
For too long, the claim that hydroelectric power came cheap masked the
exorbitant costs to society in the destruction of fish resources which con-
tributed, and still contribute, substantially to the economic welfare of the
Pacific Northwest. 166 Neither the problem, nor congressionally mandated
corrective and preventive actions, are limited to the Columbia River ba-
sin. They pertain to the Puget Sound area as well. 167
Similarly, a primary impetus for the recent litigation over Indian fish-
ing rights secured by the Stevens Treaties is the precipitous decline of the
salmon and steelhead resource. 168 As the Northwest Power Act was
working its way through Congress, tribes were litigating whether the
treaty fishing rights they reserved encompassed a right to prevent man-
made degradation of essential fish habitat conditions. There was no dis-
pute that substantial destruction of the fishery had occurred. 169
The concept of fish protection responsibilities in energy development is
not new. To reduce the problem to a choice between fish and energy is an
unnecessary and misleading oversimplification. Fish passage facilities
164. Fishing Vessel. 443 U.S. at 669.
165. See Northwest Power Act, supra note I. § 2(3)(A). 2(6). 4(e)(2). 4(h). 6i)(2). 16 U.S.C.
§§ 839(3)(A). 839(6), 839b(e)(2), 839(h). 839d(i)(2) (Supp. V 1981): H.R. REP No 976. Part 1.
96th Cong.. 2d Sess. 45, 48-49: 126 CONG REC H 10.680 (daily ed. Nov. 17. 1980) (remarks of
Rep. Dingell upon presenting S. 885); A Reexamination of Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Pro-
grain Issues. NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 19 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO. Sept. 1982. at 2.
166. See United States Comptroller General, Impacts and Implications of the Pacilic Northwest
Power Bill 22 (EMD-79-105 1979): WASHINGTON DEP'T OF FISHERIES. UNITED STATES FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE. & WASHINGTON DEPT OF GAME. JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING THE BIOLOGY, STA-
TUS. MANAGEMENT. AND HARVEST OF THE SALMON AND STEELHEAD RESOURCES OF THE PUGET SOUND
AND OLYMPIC PENINSULAR DRAINAGE AREAS OF WESTERN WASHINGTON 23-25 (May 14. 1973) (pre-
pared for use in Phase I of United States v. Washington); United States v. Washington. 506 F. Supp.
187, 198. 203 & n.67 (W.D. Wash. 1980). Besides the Joint Statement, the record in Phase I1 also
contains a substantial amount of other information about the impact of dams on lish in the form of
state and federal surveys and studies, discovery responses and depositions, and aflidavits of biologi-
cal consultants. For the Supreme Court's discussion of the tremendous historic and current economic
importance of the anadromous fish resource to both Indian and non-Indian fishermen, see Fishing
Vessel, 443 U.S. at 664-67 (1979).
167. See H.R. REP- No 976, Part I1, 96th Cong.. 2d Sess. 38 (1980).
168. Fishing Vessel. 443 U.S. at 669 (1979).
169. The Phase II district court noted that: "Were this trend [human destruction of the resourcel
to continue, the right to take fish would eventually be reduced to the right to dip one's net into the
water . . . and bring it out empty.- United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187. 203 (W.D
Wash. 1980).
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have been mandated by the Washington State legislature for nearly 100
years. 170 For even longer, United States courts have declared a common
law duty to permit anadromous fish to reach the reproduction and growth
areas to which they are naturally drawn at highly predictable times and
places. 171 One did not have to do much legal research or be a fish biolo-
gist to know that a great deal of what has occurred was illegal and unne-
cessarily wasteful of the fish resource.
Although legislators and judges have long imposed fish protection re-
quirements as legitimate, feasible and appropriate costs of doing busi-
ness, the requirements are most notable for having been ignored and
rarely enforced. 172 The explanation cannot be reduced to the problem of
cost. Relatively inexpensive devices could have been, but were not al-
ways, installed to prevent fish from being destroyed. 173 Site selection
could also have taken into account fish needs, but usually did not. For
example, hydro projects might have been more frequently located above
natural barriers. Recommendations for operational modifications to pro-
tect fish have often fallen on deaf ears. 174 There should be no dispute that
technology was adequate to the task of meeting both energy and fish de-
mands, if planners had been inclined to consider both needs.
With rare exception, hydroelectric developers have overlooked fish
needs. As a result, fishing interests have already borne a disproportionate
share of the real cost of energy production in the Northwest. If any cost-
benefit analysis is applied, there needs to be a reallocation of the resource
costs and risks involved.
Government agencies must, of course, share the blame with the power
producers, because the law was there but they chose not to enforce it. In
many instances, such as on the Columbia, the federal government was the
prime power developer and operator.
V. CONCLUSION
Understanding the ramifications of reserved tribal rights for hydroelec-
tric energy planning and development is exceedingly important. If fully
enforced, those rights will undoubtedly require substantial changes in
170. WASH. REv. CODE § 75.20.060 (1982); see also 1889-90 Wash. Laws 106-07 (prohibiting
obstruction of streams), amended, 1893 Wash. Laws 270.
171. See, e.g., Holyoke Water-PowerCo. v. Lyman, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 500, 512 (1872); Mad-
dox v. International Paper Co., 47 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. La. 1942); People v. Truckee Lumber Co.,
116 Cal. 397, 48 P. 374 (1897); Cottril v. Myrick, 12 Me. 222, 229-34 (1835); Commonwealth v.
Chapin, 22 Mass. 199, 202-03 (1827); Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. 521,528 (Pick. 1808).
172. See supra note 72.
173. See supra note 6.
174. Id.
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past approaches. Full compliance with Indian treaties and other reserved
tribal rights is, however, not an impossible task, nor one that will halt the
progress of modem civilization. Substantial change in past hydro prac-
tices in the interest of preserving and restoring fish and wildlife resources
is, after all, what Congress mandated in the Northwest Power Act as a
necessary and feasible task.
Reserved tribal rights should serve as an additional incentive to using
the full force of the Act to address a very serious and critical problem: the
drastic depletion of a highly valuable and irreplacable natural resource.
To the extent that the Act's fish provisions are inadequate to protect the
reserved rights of tribes, special measures will be necessary. Those mea-
sures, however, will bring benefits to present and future generations of
Indians and non-Indians alike. In addition, a nation will have the honor of
having kept its word.
